| International Journal of Computer Applications |
| Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA |
| Volume 187 - Number 146 |
| Year of Publication: 2026 |
| Authors: Yang Yang, Shu Jiang, Hong Ye, Yanyi She, Ming Liu, Yuefeng Li |
10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5
|
Yang Yang, Shu Jiang, Hong Ye, Yanyi She, Ming Liu, Yuefeng Li . A Lightweight Flow-Statistics-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation Mechanism in SDN. International Journal of Computer Applications. 187, 146 ( Oct 2026), 47-52. DOI=10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5
Software-defined networking (SDN) provides centralized control and programmable flow management, making it suitable for dynamic detection and mitigation of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. This paper proposes a lightweight flow-statistics-based DDoS detection and mitigation mechanism for SDN. The controller periodically collects OpenFlow flow statistics and extracts four interpretable indicators: aggregated packet rate, source count, flow count, and normalized source-address entropy. A destination is first marked as a candidate attack target when all four traffic conditions are simultaneously satisfied, and a DDoS attack is confirmed only when the suspicious state persists for a predefined duration, thereby suppressing alarms caused by transient traffic bursts. Once an attack is confirmed, the controller dynamically installs high-priority source-specific drop rules and uses an OpenFlow barrier mechanism to confirm mitigation-rule processing. Experiments were conducted in a Mininet environment using Ryu, Open vSwitch, and OpenFlow 1.3. Low-, medium-, and high-rate UDP DDoS scenarios were independently repeated three times, with observed packet rates of 481.81 ± 1.09 pps, 964.00 ± 0.98 pps, and 1606.10 ± 1.08 pps, respectively. The attack-confirmation duration remains approximately 1 s, while the mean barrier-confirmed mitigation delay ranges from 0.7938 ms to 0.8878 ms. A 0.5-s multi-source burst satisfies the traffic-feature conditions but is not confirmed as a DDoS attack, demonstrating the effectiveness of the suspicious-duration mechanism. Additional experiments show that TCP SYN and ICMP flooding attacks can also be successfully detected and mitigated. The installed source-specific rules effectively block attack traffic while preserving legitimate communication with the victim host.