| International Journal of Computer Applications |
| Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA |
| Volume 187 - Number 127 |
| Year of Publication: 2026 |
| Authors: Daniel Ward |
10.5120/ijca54a0f5aecad7
|
Daniel Ward . A Decoy Placement Model for Engineering Workstations and Historian Systems in Manufacturing OT Networks. International Journal of Computer Applications. 187, 127 ( Jul 2026), 53-61. DOI=10.5120/ijca54a0f5aecad7
Engineering workstations and historian systems concentrate control-project artifacts, privileged maintenance paths, and process knowledge in manufacturing operational technology (OT) networks. This paper develops and evaluates a safety-constrained decoy placement model for those assets. The revised study combines design science with a reproducible computational experiment built on a 26-node, 54-edge directed manufacturing OT attack graph. Six attack scenarios were tested against a no-deception baseline and four equal-budget alternatives: demilitarized-zone-heavy, random, betweenness-centrality, and asset-proximal placement. Each strategy was evaluated with 10,000 Monte Carlo trials per scenario under a five-decoy budget, resulting in 360,000 nominal trials with an arbitrary fixed seed of 314159. The proposed distributed placement achieved weighted pre-impact detection of 0.639 (95% CI 0.636-0.643), compared with 0.587 for asset-proximal placement, 0.574 for centrality placement, 0.411 for random placement, 0.356 for DMZ-heavy placement, and 0.122 for the baseline. Critical-target reach declined to 0.361. The advantage remained under reduced-fidelity and attacker-policy sensitivity tests. The results support distributed, high-value placement across remote access, engineering, project-file, historian, and protocol-discovery paths. The experiment is synthetic and does not claim live-plant effectiveness, but it provides falsifiable, reproducible evidence for comparative placement decisions.