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Reseach Article

Model based on Hybridized Game Theory to Optimize Logistics: Case of Blood Supply Chain

by Salma Mouatassim, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, Jamal Benhra, My Ali El Oualidi
International Journal of Computer Applications
Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA
Volume 145 - Number 15
Year of Publication: 2016
Authors: Salma Mouatassim, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, Jamal Benhra, My Ali El Oualidi
10.5120/ijca2016910910

Salma Mouatassim, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, Jamal Benhra, My Ali El Oualidi . Model based on Hybridized Game Theory to Optimize Logistics: Case of Blood Supply Chain. International Journal of Computer Applications. 145, 15 ( Jul 2016), 37-48. DOI=10.5120/ijca2016910910

@article{ 10.5120/ijca2016910910,
author = { Salma Mouatassim, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, Jamal Benhra, My Ali El Oualidi },
title = { Model based on Hybridized Game Theory to Optimize Logistics: Case of Blood Supply Chain },
journal = { International Journal of Computer Applications },
issue_date = { Jul 2016 },
volume = { 145 },
number = { 15 },
month = { Jul },
year = { 2016 },
issn = { 0975-8887 },
pages = { 37-48 },
numpages = {9},
url = { https://ijcaonline.org/archives/volume145/number15/25358-2016910910/ },
doi = { 10.5120/ijca2016910910 },
publisher = {Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA},
address = {New York, USA}
}
%0 Journal Article
%1 2024-02-06T23:48:59.066636+05:30
%A Salma Mouatassim
%A Mustapha Ahlaqqach
%A Jamal Benhra
%A My Ali El Oualidi
%T Model based on Hybridized Game Theory to Optimize Logistics: Case of Blood Supply Chain
%J International Journal of Computer Applications
%@ 0975-8887
%V 145
%N 15
%P 37-48
%D 2016
%I Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA
Abstract

Several researches have been done to optimize different flows in blood supply chain. However, the use of game theory in this sense is rare. The following work focus on the case of Morocco, consisting of 16 Regional Blood Transfusion Centers (RBTC) centralized around a National Blood Transfusion and Hematology Center (NBTHC). An approach based on hybridized game theory is adopted to form core and strongly stable coalitions and optimize as much as possible the transport cost. Firstly, the optimal cost of each coalition of the 33 possible coalitions; that the Director of NBTHC validated; is computed by using a mixed integer linear Programming model (MILP). Then these costs are introduced as data of two other MILP to define which structure minimizes the total cost allocated to each RTBC while maintaining core stability, in the case of the first MILP, and strong equilibrium in the case of the second. The VRPPDTW is also introduced within each coalition in order to optimize the cost of transport more.

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Index Terms

Computer Science
Information Sciences

Keywords

Optimization Game theory Blood supply chain Collaborative logistics VRPPDTW